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STORIES  OF  0 S:  
TRANSGENDER WOMEN,  MONSTROUS BODIES ,   
AND THE  CANADIAN PRISON SYSTEM 
Allison Smith* 
ABSTRACT 
Prisons regulate identities and what rights get recognized and protected in a 
prison setting. Gender is a core element of identity that is policed by the 
prison system and by the law that governs prisons. Focusing on develop-
ments within Canadian transgender jurisprudence, this paper explores how 
prisoners’ bodies that do not conform to a strict gender binary are defined as 
inhuman. By critically assessing the prison system and prison policy, this  
essay demonstrates how Canadian law has often failed to address the needs 
and lived experiences of transgender women in their interactions with the 
penal system.  
As case law demonstrates, the rights of cisgender women—that is, 
women whose gender and anatomy have aligned since birth—tend to trump 
the rights of transgender women. Implicit in this tendency is a judgment as to 
whom the law will recognize as ‘real.’ This paper challenges the logic of pro-
tecting women deemed authentic when such protection comes at the expense 
of transgender women. To that end, the pivotal cases of Kavanagh v Canada 
(Attorney General) and Forrester v Peel (Regional Municipality) Police Services Board 
are examined. These cases show how the law’s reliance on genitals as the 
primary signifier of gender contributes to the dehumanization of the trans-
gender subject in a prison setting. In order to query this logic of genitocen-
trism, this paper also examines developments in transgender jurisprudence 
outside the prison context. It concludes with an analysis of XY v Ontario 
(Minister of Government and Consumer Services) in order to track the movement of 
Canadian law away from a transphobia that allows body parts to speak for 
individuals.  
Citation: (2014) 23 Dal J Leg Stud 149. 
                                                                                                                                            
* Allison Smith, B.A., M.A., is a third year law student at the Schulich School of Law. She will graduate in 
Spring 2014. 




Prisons, like bathrooms, bedrooms, streets, and courtrooms, are spaces in which 
identities are continuously negotiated and reinforced. In each of these spaces, people in 
positions of power repeatedly answer the question as to who fits the category of human. 
By its very nature, a prison is a space in which the power of individuals is severely lim-
ited or else taken away entirely. In order to function as regulatory bodies, prisons strip 
individuals of their power over their ability to move freely, to eat and sleep when they 
desire, to interact with others, and to engage in other activities that non-incarcerated 
individuals practice with a far greater degree of liberty. Prisons narrow the world for 
those inside, both in terms of literal space and also in terms of the conceptual space of 
individual capacity for choice and self-determination. 
In addition to regulating and limiting activities, the prison system also polices and 
regulates identities. One of the elements of identity that is most rigidly policed by the 
prison system, as well as the law that informs and governs it, is gender. Focusing on 
developments within Canadian transgender jurisprudence, this paper explores how 
bodies that are not easily readable and recognizable in terms of a strict gender binary are 
placed outside the space of the human within Canada’s prison system. It employs an 
analysis of the prison system as a case study in order to query how Canadian law has 
failed to address particular issues facing transgender women in their interactions with 
the legal system. In particular, its focus is on how Canadian jurisprudence has often 
privileged some individuals as more ‘authentic’ than others. As my analysis of case law 
will demonstrate, the rights of transgender women have often been disregarded or 
compromised for the sake of protecting cisgender women. Cisgender women—that is, 
women whose gender and anatomy have aligned since birth—have often been treated as 
more ‘real’ under the law than transgender women. This tendency of the law to privilege 
cisgender women continues despite advancements in jurisprudence that extend protec-
tion and recognize the right of transgender Canadians to equal treatment and the 
preservation of dignity. The purpose of this paper is to query the logic of protecting 
women deemed ‘authentic’ at the expense of transgender women. Implicit in this logic 
is an unexamined and destructive transphobia that silences voices and instead allows 
body parts to speak for individuals. It demonstrates a desire to categorize, to objectify, 
and to hierarchize human subjects. Given Canadian law’s Charter-era commitment to 
equality rights, this logic must be questioned and dismantled. 
II. BACKGROUND AND LEGAL CONTEXT 
Historically, the law and its subsidiary, the penal system, have had difficulty con-
ceptualizing the meaning of gender identity and its distinctness from biology. It is all too 
often taken for granted by not only law, but culture more generally, that the gender of 
individuals will conform to sexual anatomy. As Judith Butler explores in her seminal 
work, Bodies that Matter, when a girl is born, the phrase “It’s a girl!” initiates her into a 
gendered category that she is expected to adhere to through her gender presentation 
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and behaviours.1 In Butler’s words, “Gender norms operate by requiring the embodi-
ment of certain ideals of femininity and masculinity, ones that are almost always related 
to the idealization of the heterosexual bond.”2 Society, culture, politics, law, and other 
regulatory entities all interact to steer bodies into pre-determined identity categories. 
Butler’s work suggests that gender is performed rather than set by anatomy. This is not to 
say that gender is easily altered on whim, but instead that it is dependent on factors 
more influential and nuanced than the mere fact of having a male or female body.3 Law 
is but one social force that expects coherence between sex and gender. Within the legal 
system, systems of discipline and punishment serve to teach and reinforce expected 
gendered behaviour. 
Canadian law is evolving in some matters relating to gender identity and expression. 
Historically, however, Canadian law has resisted conceptualizing gender as a matter of 
self-determination. Instead, our legal system has fundamentally and rigidly relied on 
anatomy to determine how an individual should be treated and understood. The ten-
dency to reduce individuals to body parts is particularly striking in relation to penal law 
and policy. Central to this paper is the pivotal 2001 federal human rights case of Synthia 
Kavanagh, in which Ms. Kavanagh (a post-operative transgender woman) was incarcer-
ated in a women’s prison, but in a decision that made clear that transgender women 
who had not undergone sex reassignment surgery would not be allowed housing in 
women’s prisons.4 Kavanagh is the leading case that sets prison policy on where 
transgender inmates will be housed in Canadian prisons—that is, in accordance to geni-
tals rather than identity. Despite the evolution in thought reflected in other areas of 
Canadian law, the penal system is one area of our law in which individuals are still cate-
gorized by and reduced to what is between their legs. 
Following an analysis of Kavanagh, I examine various modern legal histories that ar-
ticulate (or, in some cases, compromise) transgender rights. My purpose in this 
historical examination is to trace the movement in the collective legal consciousness 
relating to gender identity, and to theorize how this collective consciousness has im-
pacted law and policy that is relevant to incarcerated transgender individuals. In addition 
to Canadian law, I also explore some legal cases and policy coming out of the American 
and English context. I do this for the sake of comparison, but also on the premise that, 
even when precedent is not binding, Canada is still influenced by legal thought in other 
countries, particularly those with whom we share a common legal tradition. 
Following my exploration of gender identity and legal history, I explore the 2006 
case of Forrester, in which a transgender woman was strip-searched by Ontario police. 
Because Ms. Forrester had male anatomy, she was subjected to a “split search,” in 
which female officers searched her top half and male officers searched her from the 
waist down.5 Ms. Forrester felt degraded and humiliated by this experience.6 Though 
prison policy has changed with regard to strip-searching transgender individuals, the 
responses of some of the officers demonstrate assumptions and attitudes that are worth 
exploring in depth. Uncertain of how to conceptualize Ms. Forrester, some of the offic-
                                                                                                                                            
1 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 2003) at 232. 
2 Ibid at 231-32. 
3 Ibid at 226-37. 
4 Kavanagh v Canada (Attorney General), [2001] CHRD No 21 (available on CanLII), (CHRT) [Kavanagh]. 
5 Forrester v Peel (Regional Municipality) Police Services Board, 2006 HRTO 13 at para 1, [2006] OHRTD No 13 
(QL) [Forrester]. 
6 Ibid at para 35.  
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ers referred to her in their notes by derogatory names or phrases that placed her outside 
gender entirely. One officer defined Ms. Forrester by an incongruous “0” in his note-
book—a mark that could signify either an “O” for “other” or a “0” as in zero.7 By 
either meaning, this officer’s notation marked what Ms. Forrester was to him—either 
something outside normal categories of understanding, or something so unrecognizable 
that it constituted a zero, nothing at all. These ways of understanding Ms. Forrester—as 
either other or nothing—are, for the purposes of my research, a metonym of how  
Canadian law, and in particular the penal system, has conceptualized transgender indi-
viduals as abnormal, subhuman, or unrecognizable. The stories of transgender women 
are often the stories of 0s—the stories of those who are disregarded, othered, displaced, 
misrecognized, or subject to erasure. While there were policy improvements ordered in 
Forrester with reference to how transgender people are handled in a strip search situa-
tion,8 the fact that transgender people are still assigned by genitalia in the prison context 
is itself dehumanizing and validates a ranking of rights in which the rights of 
transgender women are compromised.  
As I have noted, I am interested in examining how transgender rights are compro-
mised through deference to the rights of other groups. The federal Human Rights 
Tribunal’s decision in Kavanagh reflects a highly paternalistic logic that has as its stated 
motivation the protection of cisgender women. The decision justifies disallowing pre-
operative transgender women (which includes transgender women who never intend to 
have genital surgery) from being housed in women’s prisons on the basis of the fear and 
possible misunderstanding on the part of biologically female inmates, some of whom 
have been subject to male violence and so presumably would not be comfortable 
housed with a person who has male genitalia. In other words, infringing the dignity of 
pre-operative transgender women is deemed justifiable in the name of protecting cis-
gender women. This kind of logic is implicitly problematic in that it rests on the notion 
that cisgender women are especially delicate and in need of protection. By this logic, 
cisgender women are coded as feminine (delicate, weak, unthreatening), whereas 
transgender women are still coded as masculine (strong, hostile, threatening). As I have 
stressed, it is also problematic because of its enforcement of a hierarchy of rights. The 
Vancouver Rape Relief Society v Nixon case reflects some of the same paternalistic reasoning 
as in Kavanagh, both on the part of the Rape Relief Shelter and the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal, where the case was heard in 2005.9 The Shelter refused to permit Ms. 
Nixon, a transgender woman, to give volunteer counselling services to women who had 
experienced male violence because of her status as a transgender woman. This triggered 
Ms. Nixon’s human rights complaint, which was successful at the Tribunal level10 but 
ultimately overruled at the Court of Appeal level. The reasoning in both Nixon and 
Kavanagh are based in the notion that cisgender women need protection from 
transgender women.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to suggest an ideal solution for where and how 
transgender women should be housed in Canadian prisons. Instead, the purpose of this 
work is to query the ways in which essentialist attitudes that define gender by anatomy 
still exist in Canadian law and in particular Canadian penal law. The reality of 
                                                                                                                                            
7 Ibid at para 285. 
8 Ibid at para 476. 
9 Vancouver Rape Relief Society v Nixon, 2005 BCCA 601, 262 DLR (4th) 360. 
10 Nixon v Vancouver Rape Relief Society, 2002 BCHRT 1, 2002 CarswellBC 3557 (WL Can). 
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transgender women as authentic women is still questioned within Canadian law, where 
there is still little protection on the basis of gender identity and gender expression.  
These grounds exist in the Human Rights Codes of Ontario, Manitoba, the Northwest 
Territories, and Nova Scotia.11 However, on the national level, vital protections are not 
yet guaranteed in human rights law through the inclusion of gender identity and gender 
expression as protected grounds. It remains to be seen how the growing reflection of 
transgender rights in Canadian law will affect the status of transgender individuals in 
Canadian prisons. 
III. KAVANAGH: ANATOMY, PLACEMENT, AND THE ERASURE OF IDENTITY 
In her essay “Transsexuals in Canadian prisons: An equality analysis,” lawyer and 
transgender rights advocate barbara findlay12 suggests that “[t]he assumption that there 
exist two and only two genders in humankind is deeply entrenched in the Canadian legal 
system, as it is in Canadian society.”13 findlay acted as counsel for Ms. Kavanagh in her 
human rights complaint against Corrections Services Canada (CSC). findlay stresses that 
incarceration is particularly difficult for transgender individuals because they are held in 
the facility appropriate to their birth sex rather than their gender identity, except in cases 
in which they have had sex reassignment surgery.14 As an example of the dehumanizing 
attitudes of law enforcement towards transgender individuals, findlay quotes the words 
of a sheriff in the courtroom where Ms. Kavanagh’s human rights complaint was heard: 
“As far as we are concerned they are male until they get the piece of paper saying that 
they are female. It is that simple.”15 
The facts of Kavanagh are as follows. Synthia Kavanagh was a male-to-female 
transgender woman who was housed in a men’s prison. She was born with male anato-
my, but lived as a woman since she was 13 years old. In 1993, Ms. Kavanagh filed three 
complaints with the Canadian Human Rights Commission. At the time of her incarcera-
tion for a life term, Ms. Kavanagh had been undergoing hormone therapy. In prison, 
however, she was not permitted to continue this hormone therapy. The changes in her 
body that had manifested because of this treatment began to reverse. 
Ms. Kavanagh’s human rights complaints alleged discrimination on the basis of sex 
and disability.16 The foundation for her disability claim was that she had been medically 
diagnosed with gender dysphoria. Ms. Kavanagh argued that CSC had discriminated 
against her by withholding hormone treatment, denying her request for sex reassign-
ment surgery, and placing her in a male institution.17 She argued that CSC should be 
required to a change its policies with regard to where pre-operative transgender inmates 
                                                                                                                                            
11 Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H19 s 1; The Human Rights Code, CCSM c H175 s 9(2); Human Rights Act, 
SNWT 2002, c 18; Bill 140, An Act to Amend Chapter 214 of the Revised Statutes, 1989, the Human Rights Act, to 
Protect the Rights of Transgendered Persons, 4th Sess, 61 General Assembly, Nova Scotia, 2012 [Bill 140]. 
12 findlay deliberately spells her name without capital letters. 
13 barbara findlay, “Transsexuals in Canadian prisons: An equality analysis” (Paper delivered at the Justice and 
Equality Summit, 1999) at 9, [unpublished], [findlay, “Equality analysis”]. 
14 Ibid at 19. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Kavanagh, supra note 4 at para 7. 
17 Ibid at para 7. 
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were housed, suggesting that the current policy did not “acknowledge the psychological 
need to be imprisoned with other members of one’s psychological sex.”18 The second 
part of her claim alleged discrimination because sex reassignment surgery was unavaila-
ble to incarcerated individuals under section 31 of CSC’s Health Services policy.19 
The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal agreed with Ms. Kavanagh that the policy of 
housing transgender women in male prisons had adverse effects on pre-operative 
transgender women.20 In the Tribunal’s view, CSC had not adequately taken into  
account the special vulnerabilities of pre-operative transgender inmates.21 The Tribunal 
ordered that CSC develop a policy in consultation with the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission to ensure that transgender inmates are accommodated with reference to 
placement.22 However, the Tribunal also held that CSC was justified in not placing pre-
operative transgender individuals in the facility that corresponds with their gender iden-
tity. In other words, while the Tribunal called for development of further policy, it also 
approved and affirmed the policy, which still stands, that places transgender people in 
prisons according to their genitals rather than their identities. 
The Tribunal also held in Kavanagh that the absolute ban on sex reassignment sur-
gery while in prison was not justified.23 It required CSC to amend its policy in 
consultation with the Tribunal in order to allow for better access to sex reassignment 
surgery. Under the Commissioner’s Directive on Health Services, section 36 now states: 
Sex reassignment surgery shall be considered during incarceration only when: 
1. a recognized gender identity specialist has confirmed that the of-
fender has satisfied the real life test, as described in the Harry 
Benjamin Standards of Care, for a minimum of one year prior to 
incarceration; and 
2. the recognized gender identity specialist recommends surgery dur-
ing incarceration.24 
What this means is that if a transgender inmate completes a qualifying period during 
which he or she lives as his or her target gender and is recommended for surgery by a 
specialist, sex reassignment surgery will be permitted. Section 37 of the Directive states 
that if the specialist determines that the surgery is an essential medical service, CSC will 
pay the cost of the procedure.25 
While there are elements of the Kavanagh decision that allow for increased protec-
tion and access to health services for transgender inmates, there are also elements of the 
decision that are problematic. Ms. Kavanagh herself, once she had undergone sex reas-
signment surgery, was placed in a women’s facility, as she desired. Whatever victory this 
entails, however, it must be remembered that the decision neglects the needs of 
                                                                                                                                            
18 Ibid at para 92. 
19 Ibid at paras 168-71. 
20 Ibid at para 141. 
21 Ibid at para 166. 
22 Ibid at para 200. 
23 Ibid at para 183. 
24 Correctional Service Canada, Commissioner’s Directive on Health Services CD 800 (April 18 2004), s 36. 
25 Ibid, s 37. 
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transgender individuals who either cannot have sex reassignment surgery or who choose 
not to. 
Under the guise of protecting cisgender women from the threat of male bodies, 
transgender women who have not had sex reassignment surgery were completely denied 
housing in women’s prisons as a result of the decision. While the Tribunal acknow-
ledges the special vulnerabilities of transgender inmates, it is ultimately more deferential 
to the vulnerabilities of cisgender women. While cisgender women deserve to be free 
from the threat of violence or other safety concerns in all spaces, including prisons, it is 
notable that, in the policy that exists, this protection comes at the expense of the dignity 
of transgender women. It could be argued that where one is housed is not important so 
long as one’s identity is acknowledged and respected. However, where one is housed is 
by its very nature a confirmation or denial of one’s gender identity. To set up prisons 
according to the gender binary—that is, men’s prisons and women’s prisons—and then 
to assign individuals to these prisons according to genitalia is to affirm the notion that 
sex and gender are synonymous. This logic is at odds with the growing awareness in 
Canadian law and culture that the recognition of gender identity by the state is vital to 
human dignity. This recognition is affirmed most notably in the 2012 case of XY v 
Ontario (Minister of Government and Consumer Services).26 In XY, the Ontario Human Rights 
Tribunal held that legislation requiring a person to have “transsexual surgery” before 
being permitted to change the sex designation on their birth certificate is discrimina-
tory.27 The significance of XY is that Canadian jurisprudence is beginning to recognize 
the human right to self-define and be granted state recognition in accordance with one’s 
gender identity. 
It is worth examining in depth the Tribunal’s logic in Kavanagh in order to under-
stand how it neglects gender non-conforming individuals. In the decision, the Tribunal 
explores CSC’s rationalization for denying pre-operative transgender individuals housing 
with their target gender and subjects this to the justification stage of the Meiorin and 
Grismer test. The Human Rights Commission, acting as intervener, argued that pre-
operative transgender individuals should be housed according to gender identity. The 
Tribunal summarized the Commission’s argument as follows: 
According to the Commission, the evidence adduced by CSC to justify its re-
fusal to allow pre-operative transsexuals to be placed in institutions that 
accord with their target gender is highly impressionistic. The Commission 
further submits that CSC’s contention that pre-operative male to female 
transsexuals cannot be placed in female prisons because of the reaction of 
female inmates is extremely troubling, as it gives legitimacy to the prejudicial 
attitudes of others, which attitudes are based upon fear and misinformation. 
It is up to CSC, the Commission says, to address these discriminatory atti-
tudes through education, and, if necessary, through improved security.28 
The Tribunal, however, refused to accept the suggestion that the potential negative 
reaction of cisgender inmates to pre-operative transgender women should be addressed 
through educating cisgender inmates. Instead, the Tribunal opined that the threat posed 
                                                                                                                                            
26 XY v Ontario (Minister of Government and Consumer Services), [2012] OHRTD No 715, 74 CHRR D/331 [XY]. 
27 Ibid at paras 14-18. 
28 Kavanagh, supra note 4 at para 147. 
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by pre-operative transgender women in women’s prisons was insurmountable because 
of the special needs of cisgender women. To quote from the decision itself: 
It…strikes us as overly simplistic to say that the female inmate population 
would be reacting out of fear and ignorance, and that, with a little education, 
they could be taught to accept an anatomically male inmate in their facility. 
The difficulties that female inmates have in dealing with men are based, in 
part on lack of knowledge, but are also based on painful life experience. It 
appears from the evidence that many of these women are psychologically 
damaged, as a consequence of the physical, psychological and sexual abuse 
they have suffered at the hands of men. Like transsexuals, female inmates are 
a vulnerable group, who are entitled to have their needs recognized and res-
pected.29 
While the needs of cisgender women should be fully addressed, the needs of 
transgender women should not as a consequence be disregarded. It is well worth noting 
that Ms. Kavanagh herself, when housed in a men’s prison, faced continuous harass-
ment. Her experience of showering with male prisoners and being strip searched by 
male prison guards was in her words “humiliating.”30 Ms. Kavanagh was subject to 
taunting and sexual assault while housed with the general male population and tried to 
cut off her penis in desperation.31 Following these events, she served several years in 
segregation.32 Transgender women in such a position (pre-operative and housed with 
men) are realistically in a similar position to many of the cisgender women that the 
Tribunal wanted to protect from the threat of male bodies and male violence: these 
women, like their cisgender counterparts, also regularly experience living in fear of the 
threat of sexual assault and violence at the hands of men. However, as it stands, the 
prison system has yet to provide adequate protection that is not demeaning. 
In the Canadian context, there is a scarcity of data about the occurrence of sexual 
assault committed on transgender inmates. However, in the introduction to a volume of 
essays on the rights of transgender individuals, Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang, and 
Shannon Price Minter note the general trend of violence against transgender people that 
occurs in all spaces.33 This violence is widespread, insidious, and has significance for the 
humanity and dignity of the transgender community at large. Currah, Juang, and Minter 
discuss the 2003 murder of transgender teenager Gwen Araujo, which they suggest is 
not an isolated event but part of a systemic mechanism of oppression which often finds 
its outlet in violence.34 Extrapolating on these ideas, they note the gravity of violence 
against transgender women in the prison context: 
While this epidemic of actual violence goes largely unnoticed by the mass 
media, it is an ever-present reality for transgender people—and especially for 
transgender women, who are most often the victims of such crimes. This 
                                                                                                                                            
29 Ibid at para 158. 




33 Paisley Currah, Richard M Juang & Shannon Price Minter, “Introduction” in Paisley Currah, Richard M 
Juang & Shannon Price Minter, eds, Transgender Rights (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006). 
34 Ibid at xiv. 
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vulnerability is amplified in prisons and jails, where transgender prisoners 
typically are housed by their birth sex and where transgender women are par-
ticularly vulnerable to rape by both fellow prisoners and guards.35 
Even without data recording the numbers of assaults against transgender women in 
Canadian prisons, it is easy to envision how they as a group are particularly vulnerable. 
Within a prison environment, any individual is implicitly vulnerable because of the 
power imbalance at the heart of the prisoner and guard relationship. However, some 
individuals become more vulnerable because of the highly gendered power hierarchy 
that is formed in this environment, by both guards and inmates themselves. Activist and 
sociologist Lori Girshick comments on how prisons reinforce the gender binary in 
troubling ways. In her words, “Men’s prisons are set up to emasculate men, and wom-
en’s prisons are designed to reinforce dependence and passive roles for women… 
Female prisoners are expected to be passive, emotional, weak, submissive, and depend-
ent.”36 As Girshick’s analysis makes clear, femininity is associated with weakness and 
passivity, and thus becomes a basis for abuse. Placed in a men’s prison only because she 
has a penis, a transgender woman would likely be vulnerable to harassment and other 
forms of victimization because she does not fit the codes of masculinity expected by 
other men in the prison environment. 
One of very few articles exploring the situation of transgender inmates in Canada is 
by Rebecca Mann, who comments on the particular problems faced by transgender 
inmates not only in Canada but in the American and Australian contexts as well.37 Mann 
comments on the problems with placing transgender women within men’s prisons 
because of the high possibility of assault. In her words, 
Genitalia-based placement puts the transgender inmate, the male-to-female 
transgender inmate in particular, at a significant risk of being beaten, raped, 
or even killed… The nature of the prison hierarchy in a male facility ranks 
prisoners based on their fighting ability and “manliness.” Transgender in-
mates are often considered “queens.” They take on traditionally feminine 
tasks such as doing the laundry and cleaning, and are often used for prostitu-
tion, either by choice or by being beaten into submission.38 
Though these particular comments are with reference to research on the American 
prison system, they are useful in analyzing the way that prison culture in general con-
forms to a hierarchical structure in which gendered violence is perpetuated on those 
who are deemed feminine. As I have discussed, the decision in Kavanagh to deny pre-
operative transgender women housing in women’s prisons was done for the purpose of 
protecting cisgender women. However, it is notable that the Tribunal does not specifi-
                                                                                                                                            
35 Ibid at xiv. 
36 Lori Girshick, “Out of Compliance: Masculine-Identified People in Women’s Prisons” in Eric A Stanley & 
Nat Smith, eds, Captive Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison Industrial Complex (Baltimore: AK Press, 2011) 
191. 
37 Rebecca Mann, “The Treatment of Transgender Prisoners, Not Just an American Problem – A Compara-
tive 
Analysis of American, Australian, and Canadian Prison Policies Concerning the Treatment of Transgender 
Prisoners and a ‘Universal’ Recommendation To Improve Treatment” (2006) 15 Law & Sex 91 [Mann, 
“Treatment”]. 
38 Ibid at 105. 
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cally contemplate the threat of violence faced by transgender women placed in men’s 
institutions. The Tribunal notes that the vulnerabilities of pre-operative transgender 
inmates must be taken into account in terms of assessing placement.39 However, what is 
glaringly lacking from its decision is an analysis of how transgender women in particular 
are victimized and subject to violence because they are transgender women. To ignore the 
particular gender-based vulnerability of transgender women as women, involves an 
implicit denial that these women are indeed women. 
IV. SAVING ‘REAL’ WOMEN:  
THE RANKING OF RIGHTS AND THE BESTOWAL OF AUTHENTICITY 
The Tribunal’s failure to acknowledge the particular problems faced by pre-
operative transgender women creates a hierarchy in which the needs of certain women 
(cisgender women) are ranked above the needs of other women (transgender women). 
The effect is to reinforce a binary whereby some women are explicitly served and others 
are conceptually erased. The refusal to place pre-operative transgender women in wom-
en’s prisons for the purpose of protecting cisgender women is, though undoubtedly well 
intentioned, paternalistic at its core. It is evocative of postcolonial theorist Gayatri 
Spivak’s famous statement about “white men…saving brown women from brown 
men.”40 Referring to Western concerns about the Indian practice of widow suicide in 
India, “white men saving brown women” has come to generally refer to the racialized 
paternalism that is used to justify colonialist practices in the name of liberating racialized 
women who, by Western standards, are seen as oppressed. In other words, the West 
justifies certain oppressive acts by acting in the name of liberating racialized women. 
Shahnaz Khan describes how Spivak’s phrase is manifest in events where Third 
World women are used as justification for Western intervention. Khan’s analysis centres 
on the invasion of Afghanistan by the United States. She notes that the First Ladies of 
Britain and the United States both used the rhetoric of feminism in order to justify the 
notion that “Afghanistan needed rescuing.”41 In Khan’s words, “The desire to save 
brown women from brown men…as a strategy, or excuse if you like, for military in-
volvement in their countries…is another example of colonial feminism.”42 Colonial 
feminism is a feminism that uses the supposed weakness of women as a rationale and 
justification for behaviour which itself should be subject to anti-oppressive analysis. 
Because women are seen as naturally weak and in need of protection, it becomes easy to 
justify problematic acts in the name of liberating these women. Khan’s analysis does not 
ignore the fact that Afghani women were and are subject to gender-based oppression. 
However, her point is to critique the West’s tendency to frame particular issues in terms 
of essentialist and paternalistic notions about racialized women who need to be saved. 
The suggestion that brown women need liberation gives the public simple, emotionally 
                                                                                                                                            
39 Kavanagh, supra note 4 at para 165. 
40 Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in L Grossberg & C Nelson, eds, Marxism and the Interpretation of 
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charged content to digest, while ignoring the nuances of complex issues. If invading 
Afghanistan can be framed as a mission to save oppressed women, other issues, such as 
stories of victims and collateral damage, can be given less media attention.43 Ultimately, 
the concept of “saving brown women” paints one group as oppressive (racialized men) 
through painting another group as oppressed (racialized women). The effect of this is to 
ignore and erase all the individuality within these groups, and to efface the fact that 
those doing the liberating may be contributing to oppression themselves. 
I bring up Spivak and Khan’s analysis for the purposes of drawing an analogy be-
tween the practice of saving brown women from brown men and the practice of saving 
cisgender women from transgender women in a prison context. The cost of protecting 
female inmates from pre-operative transgender women is that the latter group is lumped 
together as an object of threat. While the Human Rights Commission argued in  
Kavanagh that the refusal to house pre-operative transgender women in women’s prisons 
gave legitimacy to prejudices about transgender women,44 the Tribunal ignored this 
argument. Whether a pre-operative transgender woman actually constituted such a 
threat was not considered. The Tribunal had good intentions in not wanting to subject 
incarcerated cisgender women to the threat of male violence. However, it is hard to 
divorce the Tribunal’s logic from the stereotype-based logic that says that women 
should be sheltered, and that the presence of a penis entails the threat of violence. I do 
not dispute that a significant number of these women have been subject to physical and 
psychological violence by men before incarceration, as the Tribunal suggests. However, 
to associate pre-operative transgender women with male violence is to erase the identity 
and the uniqueness of these people as individuals and instead define them by anatomy 
and all that is associated with this anatomy. 
The paternalism of the Tribunal is also strikingly similar to the logic used by oppo-
nents of transgender rights who claim that allowing transgender women to use female 
washrooms would mean putting cisgender women in jeopardy. A recent example of this 
logic occurred in October 2012 when Calgary Member of Parliament Rob Anders ex-
pressed his desire to stop Bill C-279, a private member’s bill that would add gender 
identity and gender expression to the Canadian Human Rights Act and to the hate crime 
section of the Criminal Code as protected grounds. Anders referred to the bill as the 
“bathroom bill” and suggested that its purpose was to give transgender women (whom 
he mistakenly referred to as transgender men) access to women’s washrooms.45 Randall 
Garrison, who introduced the bill, criticized Anders’ comments, suggesting that they 
equated transgender individuals with sexual predators.46 Sadly, the kind of rhetoric used 
by Anders, which suggests that transgender women are a threat to cisgender women, is 
not uncommon. Its logic grounds itself in protecting women, but only protecting those 
women it deems authentic women. It is also grounded in condescending assumptions 
about women needing protection; this point is evident in comments such as Anders’, 
which are inevitably about the threat of transgender women in women’s bathrooms, 
rather than transgender men in men’s bathrooms. 
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Before I move on from Kavanagh, I should note that, while the decision made clear 
that in Canada transgender inmates are to be housed based on their genitalia, pre-
operative transgender women are not always placed with the male population. An alter-
native option is segregation. Mann writes of a pre-operative transgender woman who, at 
the time of her article, was housed at the Bath Institution, a medium security men’s 
prison in Ontario. This woman was given a separate living area and was allowed to dress 
in women’s clothing and wear cosmetics. However, elsewhere in her article, Mann 
comments on the problems with segregating transgender individuals from the general 
population. In her words, “segregation is a convenience for the system and only solves 
the problem from the prison administration’s point of view, while simultaneously in-
creasing the problems for transgender inmates.”47 Mann notes that one of the greatest 
problems with segregation is that it deprives inmates of human contact.48 While placing 
a transgender inmate in segregation or protective custody may be done with the inten-
tion of keeping this person safe, there is an inherent dehumanization in withholding 
social contact. 
Prison is already a restrictive space in which human dignity and comfort are com-
promised; to put someone in a place of isolation further strips them of dignity and 
comfort. In addition, to segregate one individual and not others is to differentiate that 
person and to define them by this difference. Segregation confirms individuals as social 
outcasts not only through the actual placement of them in a space outside society, but 
also through their conceptual placement in a space of difference. Putting individuals in a 
separate space not only physically removes them from social company, but also marks 
them as different and abnormal. Although writing in the context of the Nixon case, in 
which a transgender woman was prohibited from volunteering at a women’s shelter, 
barbara findlay’s analysis about excluding transgender women from women’s spaces is 
fitting. As findlay explains, “It is the quintessential nature of the oppression faced by 
transgendered people that their gender and their right to be in, or participate in gen-
dered spaces is constantly and derisively challenged.”49 As a solution, segregation 
provides advantages (increased physical safety), but also disadvantages: social isolation, 
marginalization, and the confirmation that those who are segregated are outside the 
space of normality. Rather than allowing segregation to operate as a solution to the 
problems faced by prison administrators, it is vital to analyze the situation of those 
more directly impacted by these problems—namely, the prisoners themselves. 
V. TRANSGENDER BODIES AND LEGAL HISTORY 
In Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of Law, Andrew Sharpe draws on various 
Western legal histories in order to analyze the way that law defines individuals by their 
sexual anatomy. He explores what he terms “the genitocentrism of law that is masked, 
at least partially, by the language of (bio)logic.”50 (Bio)logic, the assumption that bodies 
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define individuals, is privileged over an individual’s self-definition. The body is effec-
tively allowed to speak on behalf of the person. In other words, the supposed truth of 
the body is deemed more authentic and valid than the truth of how a person self-
defines. 
Importantly, Sharpe explores how, with this reduction of people to body parts, it is 
certain body parts rather than others that become the location of truth. Sharpe explores 
how in many significant cases, it is the genitals of an individual that are inevitably used 
to define that person’s sex rather than any other sexual feature of that body. This is 
significant in that it is based in flawed logic about genitalia as the definitive marker of 
sex. Sharpe explains how privileging genitalia as the signifier of sex is neither legally nor 
medically determinative. To borrow Sharpe’s words, “[I]n a manner that questions legal 
fidelity to science…genitalia are privileged over other factors irrespective of the specific-
ity of (bio)logical approach.”51 In other words, determining sex on the basis of one part 
of the anatomy is biologically insufficient at best. It is as much informed by the cultural 
definition of bodies as it is informed by scientific reality about bodies. 
Sharpe discusses at length the English case of Corbett v Corbett, in which the validity 
of a marriage between a biologically male person, Arthur Corbett, and a post-operative 
transgender woman, April Ashley, was questioned. According to Justice Ormrod, the 
primary issue to be determined in court was the authentic sex of Ms. Ashley. As Sharpe 
discusses, “Ormrod J. held that sex is determined at birth and by a congruence of chromo-
somal, gonadal, and genital factors.”52 While Justice Ormrod allows for physical criteria 
other than genitals to factor into a determination of sex, he makes clear that genitals are 
the most important factor. Sharpe notes that, of the three factors listed in the decision, 
Justice Ormrod held that in an event of “incongruence” (in which gonadal structure, 
genitalia, and chromosomes did not align in terms of male or female sex), genitalia 
would likely be the deciding factor used to assess sex.53   
Sharpe refers to a kind of legal reasoning which he terms the “ossification of the 
gender order.”54 This ossification occurs when courts become flexible enough to recog-
nize transgender people as their target gender, but only if and when these individuals 
have had sex reassignment surgery. It is an ossification because, though it recognizes the 
identity of post-operative transgender people, it still rigidly defines identity in terms of 
genitals alone. Sharpe terms this approach the “psychological and anatomical harmony” 
approach.55 In cases such as Corbett, courts become flexible enough to bestow post-
operative transgender people legal recognition as the gender by which they self-identify. 
However, this approach inevitably excludes those who cannot or do not want to under-
go invasive surgery to alter their genitals. 
Dean Spade has rightly pointed out the problems with the legal dependence on sex 
reassignment surgery as the basis for identity. In his words, 
[T]he reliance on medical evidence in all legal contexts in which transgender 
and other gender-transgressive people struggle for recognition is highly prob-
lematic… [It] is problematic because access to gender-related medical 
intervention is usually conditioned on successful performance of rigidly de-
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fined and harshly enforced understandings of binary gender, because many 
gender-transgressive people may not wish to undergo medical intervention, 
and because medical care of all kinds, but particularly gender-related medical 
care, remains extremely inaccessible to most low-income gender-
transgressive people.56 
Indeed, as Sharpe points out, the entire concept of pre-operative and post-operative 
people is problematic in that it creates a rigid alignment between sex reassignment sur-
gery and authenticity.57 Transgender people are perceived as more authentic if their 
genitals match their gender, a logic which places individuals in a troubling hierarchy. 
In addition to Corbett, Sharpe explores the English case of S-T (formerly J) v J, in 
which the 17-year long marriage between Ms. S-T and Mr. J was the subject of legal 
question.58 Mr. J was a transgender man who had undergone a bilateral mastectomy and 
was undergoing hormone treatment. However, because Mr. J lacked a penis, the court 
found that the marriage was, as quoted by Sharpe, a “legal impossibility.”59 The court 
decided it did not even need to apply Corbett and its test for “psychological and anatom-
ical harmony” to determine whether the marriage was legal. The question of whether 
Mr. J was a man was, to the court, not even a real question. Because Mr. J lacked a 
penis, the marriage was a same-sex union and thus deemed invalid by the court. 
A similar sweeping genitocentrism appears in Re the Marriage of C v D (falsely called C), 
an Australian case in which the court rejected the validity of an 11-year marriage be-
tween a biological woman and an intersex man. Sharpe explores this case in depth, 
noting that at birth Mr. C had a penis, an ovary, and a uterus, and what the court called 
“a normal female sex chromosome complement.”60 Before his marriage, Mr. C under-
went a double mastectomy, a hysterectomy, and “corrective” surgery on his genitalia, 
the result of which was that the court, following Corbett, held that he “exhibited as male 
in two of the three criteria.”61 Sharpe notes that, though the decision was much criti-
cized, ultimately Mr. C’s marriage was deemed null and void because he was, in Bell J.’s 
words, “a combination of male and female.”62 Essentially, Mr. C, by being both male 
and female, was neither. As Sharpe notes, the result of this judgment was that Mr. C 
would not be able to legally marry anyone, thus effectively rendering him outside the 
human.63 I address a comparable dehumanization below in terms of the Forrester case. 
Ms. Forrester, like Mr. C was treated with suspicion and aversion because she had fea-
tures of both male and female anatomy. In Ms. Forrester’s case, it was the police rather 
than the courts that dehumanized her in this manner. Still, the cases are worth compar-
ing in order to highlight a similar logic that, when faced with anatomy outside the sexual 
binary, treats people as if they are monstrous. 
Transgender people as a group are historically marginalized and as such must be 
granted protection that acknowledges the ways in which they have been the objects of 
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discriminatory treatment. Bill 140, the Transgendered Persons Protection Act, proposed add-
ing gender identity and gender expression to Nova Scotia’s Human Rights Act.64 On 
second reading in the Nova Scotia House of Assembly, MLA Leonard Preyra addressed 
the commonly held belief that transgender people are already granted protection in 
Canadian human rights law because the protected category “sex” encompasses their 
needs.65 Preyra compares this belief to historical debates around whether women were 
encompassed by the term “persons,” whether the term “man” can reasonably include 
women as well, and whether “sex” was sufficient to cover sexual orientation as a con-
cept.66 In all of these examples, the particular experiences and needs of individuals are 
erased in language. Their particular hardships cannot be acknowledged without the 
creation of linguistic and conceptual categories that recognize their distinctness as a 
group. “Sex” as a protected ground could theoretically grant protection to a gay person, 
but only in some instances. For example, if a gay woman faced discrimination by virtue 
of being a gay woman, there is an element of this discrimination that occurred because 
she was a woman. However, if the discrimination happened solely because of her sexu-
ality, “sex” would be insufficient to grant her protection. Similarly, “sex” as a category is 
insufficient to give necessary protection to transgender individuals. There are inevitably 
instances when transphobic discrimination can be encompassed by the category “sex.” 
However, as a category, “sex” is insufficient to encompass all instances where 
transgender people face discriminatory treatment. The recent inclusion of gender identi-
ty and gender expression in Nova Scotia’s Human Rights Act and other protective 
legislation allows for a greater scope of protection. It allows for the recognition that 
people may be targeted not only because they are male or female, but specifically be-
cause of the way they express their gender and self-define in terms of gender. In the 
words of Preyra, “We want to leave no doubt in the minds of our Nova Scotian people, 
wherever they may be, in the eyes of the public, in the eyes of the law, that transgender 
people are entitled to the same human rights protection as everyone else.”67 
Preyra’s comments are an acknowledgement of the ways in which transgender peo-
ple have been historically marginalized and oppressed because of their difference. This 
historical oppression is important to acknowledge in any discussion about incarceration 
and transgender individuals. As findlay has pointed out, transgender people are at a 
higher risk of incarceration than other groups.68 They are also at greater risk than other 
populations for ending up on the street as teenagers, turning to sex work, committing 
criminal offences, and experiencing addictions.69 Spade also comments on systemic 
disempowerment of transgender people, which, from youth, means they face harass-
ment and abuse at home, in school, and in the job market.70 Spade notes that the adult 
homeless shelter system is often inaccessible to transgender individuals because most of 
these facilities segregate by sex and thus will not easily accommodate transgender peo-
ple.71 
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Within the prison system itself, this systemic discrimination is reinforced and per-
petuated. Law professor Sarah Lamble notes that “queer, trans, and gender-non-
conforming people in Canada, the United States, and Britain are frequently over-
policed, over-criminalized, and over-represented in the prison system.”72 Lamble affirms 
that the system of law enforcement that already oppresses transgender people further 
contributes to their oppression within the prison setting: 
Because most prisons divide people according to their perceived genitals  
rather than their self-expressed gender identity, prisoners who don’t identify 
as ‘male’ or ‘female’ or who are gender-non-conforming are often sent to 
segregation or forced to share a cell with prisoners of a different gender, of-
ten with little regard for their safety.73 
Prisons unquestioningly affirm and maintain the gender binary. In the American 
context, Wesley Ware discusses how incarcerated youth are pathologized for behaviours 
and appearance outside the gender binary. Ware founded BreakOUT!, a project of the 
Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana that advocates for LGBTQ youth in the justice 
system. In his words, “Nowhere is the literal regulation and policing of gender and 
sexuality, particularly of low-income queer and trans youth of color [sic], so apparent 
than in juvenile courts and in the juvenile justice system in the South.”74 Ware cites 
specific examples of how the gender expression of youth is regulated in the prison 
context: “In Louisiana’s youth prisons, queer and trans youth have been subjected to 
‘sexual-identity confusion counselling,’ accused of using ‘gender identity issues’ to de-
tract from their rehabilitation, and disciplined for expressing any gender-non-
conforming behaviours or actions.”75 As an example of such discipline, Ware mentions 
one youth who was put on lockdown for having long hair.76 This type of regulation of 
gender expression implies that the state and the legal system are in a better position than 
the affected individuals to know who they are and to define their identities. Regardless 
of whether or not such dire examples of gender policing such as mentioned by Ware 
exist in Canadian prisons, the Canadian penal system still regulates gender by way of 
defining individuals by anatomy. The treatment of transgender individuals by police is 
yet another way in which law, through the arms of law enforcement, dehumanizes those 
who do not adhere to the gender binary. 
VI. FORRESTER: A STORY OF 0 
In Sharpe’s analysis of the genitocentrism of law, he suggests that much legal rea-
soning demonstrates an inability to reimagine bodies. In his words, “[the] legal 
preoccupation with sex reassignment surgery is…an effect of law’s inability to reimagine 
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bodies. In this regard, the pre-operative or non-surgical body emerges as monstrous.77 
Sharpe’s invocation of the concept of the monstrous is key. The law often treats 
transgender individuals as if they are outside the human. They are bodies that, because 
they cannot be easily defined by known binaries, are monstrous bodies. 
The case of Forrester v Peel (Regional Municipality) Police Services Board demonstrates 
how Canadian law enforcement places transgender individuals in the space of the mon-
strous.78 Forrester was heard before the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal. It concerns a 
complaint put forward by Ms. Rosalyn Forrester, a pre-operative transgender woman. 
Ms. Forrester was arrested by Ontario police and strip searched, after which she was 
taken to a Brampton court for a bail hearing, where she was strip searched a second 
time. Ms. Forrester’s complaint was founded on the protected ground of sex under 
sections 1 and 9 of Ontario’s Human Rights Code. The basis of this complaint was two-
fold: that she was verbally harassed by police officers, and that the “split” strip search 
performed on her violated her rights.79 This “split” search meant that female officers 
searched Ms. Forrester’s torso, while male officers searched her lower body because she 
had a penis. Ms. Forrester alleged that she repeatedly asked for female officers to per-
form the search, but that her requests were not granted.80 
The decision of the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal was sympathetic to Ms. For-
rester concerning her experiences. It ordered that the respondent Peel Police Services 
Board provide pre-operative transgender detainees a choice of whether male or female 
officers strip search them.81 The Tribunal heard the testimony of Dr. Andrew Joseph 
Toplack, an expert on mental health issues experienced by transgender individuals. Dr. 
Toplack stated his opinion that a “split” search did not constitute equitable treatment of 
transgender detainees, because of the fact that, in his words, the “most important reality 
is the gender identity and not the external genitalia.”82 
The decision on the whole reflects an awareness of how Ms. Forrester’s dignity 
would have been compromised by the nature of the searches performed on her. The 
Police Services Board admitted liability and suggested a new policy whereby only female 
officers would search pre-operative transgender women.83 However, the Police Services 
Board wanted to include a caveat that if a female officer should express discomfort with 
searching a transgender woman, then she could be relieved from having to perform the 
search.84 In this proposed caveat, there is a similar logic to that employed by the Tribu-
nal in Kavanagh—the logic that cisgender women should be protected from transgender 
women. Importantly, the Tribunal rejects this caveat on the basis that to allow it would 
validate discriminatory treatment. In the words of the Tribunal: 
To allow for the Respondent to include an “opt out” in its new Directive for 
some officers, would be to sanction a “chain of discrimination,” namely indi-
rect discrimination, on the transsexuality [sic] community by permitting an 
“opt out” of an involuntary service performed on them, where no equivalent 
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“opt out” is provided when the service is performed on anyone else, yet 
alone any other distinct and insular minority, which has suffered from histor-
ical disadvantage.85 
To allow a police officer to refuse to perform her duty because of fear or disgust of the 
body she has to search would be tantamount to institutionalized transphobia. The Tri-
bunal ordered that the only time when an officer would be allowed to opt out would be 
when an officer has Charter or human rights interests of her own to protect, which 
would have to be documented and authorized by the officer in charge.86 
While the Tribunal in Forrester expressed aversion to validating transphobia in law, 
what is disturbing about the case is the documented treatment of Ms. Forrester by the 
police officers that dealt with her. The reactions of these officers, taken from cross-
examinations and from their notes, are recorded in the decision itself. While it is vital to 
note that some of the officers who were examined expressed genuine awareness and 
respect for Ms. Forrester’s dignity, others either were not sure how to treat her or treat-
ed her in an overtly undignified manner, particularly in terms of the language they used 
to refer to her. Concern for the well-being of Ms. Forrester herself was strikingly absent 
from some of the officers’ recorded comments. This is especially troubling given the 
invasive and implicitly derogatory nature of a strip search itself, which Angela Davis has 
likened to sexual abuse of prisoners.87 
Some of the officers encountered by Ms. Forrester were unabashedly discrimina- 
tory in their responses to her. For example, Special Constable Charles Boersma referred 
to Ms. Forrester in his notes by the derogatory term “he/she.”88 Constable Aaron Sveda 
similarly referred to Ms. Forrester in his notes as “him/her.”89 Such terms exhibit at 
best a significant ignorance about transgender issues, and at worst a wilful interest in 
dehumanizing Ms. Forrester through language. In addition to the transphobic language 
used by the officers, it is notable that both Constable Sveda and another officer testified 
that Ms. Forrester was belligerent and verbally hostile when facing the police.90 Though 
in the case there is no allegation of racialized treatment of Ms. Forrester, a black  
woman, it is well worth questioning to what degree the assessment of Ms. Forrester as 
hostile and abusive was informed by racial stereotypes about the aggressiveness of black 
women. 
One of the most noteworthy instances of transphobic language by police was the 
use of a simple “0” on an official police document filled out when Ms. Forrester was 
taken into custody. This “0” was used to signify Ms. Forrester’s sex. Detective Sergeant 
Sue Watson, when questioned why Ms. Forrester’s sex was marked as “0” on this doc-
ument, testified that she assumed it meant “other,” but could not say for certain.91 Ms. 
Forrester’s own response to this “0,” is worth quoting at length: 
As a woman, I wasn’t being respected as a woman, and was being told I 
wasn’t a woman, or in some documents my sex was “zero”—what does that 
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mean, I’m a thing? It’s horrendous to be—I don’t know how to describe 
how I felt, completely put out there, so everybody could see how I felt about 
what happened to me…I guess the best word I can come up with is “brutal-
ized.”92 
To be marked down as either “zero” or “other,” depending on how the “0” is interpret-
ed, entails a significant erasure of fundamental human dignity. It is to be relegated to the 
monstrous, the subhuman, and the unrecognizable. Though the Tribunal distances itself 
from the officers’ transphobic comments and treatment of Ms. Forrester, it is notable 
how a similar logic still informs much Canadian law—that is, a logic which suggests 
transgender individuals (especially pre-operative transgender individuals) are neither 
authentically male nor female, but exist in a category outside. This category is marked 
only by its difference: it is outside, foreign, unnatural. Those within this category must 
be dealt with through isolation, segregation, and scrutiny. 
Though sexual orientation and gender identity are not the same and should not be 
conflated, some parallels can be drawn between the treatment of gay men and lesbians 
and the treatment of transgender people. Martha Nussbaum’s work on sexual orienta-
tion and constitutional law in an American context is helpful in that it defines what she 
terms a “politics of disgust.”93 According to Nussbaum, this politics of disgust, by 
which homosexuality is conceptually linked with bodily waste and objects of contempt, 
has formed the basis for much anti-gay sentiment and anti-gay law. Nussbaum discusses 
how lawmakers have cited disgust in order to rationalize various legal restrictions, such 
as sodomy laws and laws against same-sex marriage.94 As one example of the politics of 
disgust, Nussbaum explores how in 1950s England Lord Patrick Devlin advocated the 
view that “the disgust of the average member of society was a sufficient reason to make 
a practice illegal, even if it caused no harm to nonconsenting third parties.”95 
Though Nussbaum does not discuss gender identity, it is evident from the cases 
discussed in this essay that a similar politics of disgust informs the treatment of 
transgender individuals. The dehumanizing treatment of Ms. Forrester by law enforce-
ment officers, for example, bears witness to how our system of justice classes some 
individuals as less than human. The recorded statements of these officers demonstrate a 
wilful refusal to see Ms. Forrester as a full human being. They reduced Ms. Forrester to 
either “zero” or “other,” neither of which allows room for a recognition of a fellow 
person deserving of dignity. Susan Stryker, a professor of Gender Studies at the Univer-
sity of Arizona, discusses how the transgender body has been historically connected 
with the idea of monstrosity. In Stryker’s words, 
I am not the first to link Frankenstein’s monster and the transsexual body. 
[Feminist theologian] Mary Daly makes the connection explicit by discussing 
transsexuality in “Boundary Violation and the Frankenstein Phenomenon,” 
in which she characterizes transsexuals as the agents of a “necrophilic inva-
sion” of female space… Janice Raymond, who acknowledges Daly as a 
formative influence, is less direct when she says that “the problem of trans-
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sexuality would best be served by morally mandating it out of existence,” but 
in this statement she nevertheless echoes Victor Frankenstein’s feelings to-
wards the monster: “Begone, vile insect, or rather, stay, that I may trample 
you to dust. You reproach me with your creation.”96 
Stryker’s analysis demonstrates how transphobia is, at its root, a fear about bodies that 
cannot be easily classified. In the case of Ms. Forrester, the transgender body is subject 
to ridicule and even erasure (that is, made a zero) because it is not recognizable to the 
officers examining her. 
Stryker’s examples of Daly and Raymond demonstrate how transphobia exists not 
only in traditionally conservative forums, but also arises from feminist camps. Mary 
Daly’s notion of “necrophilic invasion” is rooted in the fear that transgender women 
will corrupt spaces reserved for real women. Daly, though an advocate of women’s 
rights, did not extend her advocacy to transgender women, whom she viewed with 
disdain. Daly’s notion of “invasion” invites comparison to the reasoning in Kavanagh, in 
which it is made clear that transgender women who have not had sex reassignment 
surgery will not be housed in prisons with other women; separate spaces must be main-
tained. Though the intention on the part of both Daly and the Ontario Human Rights 
Tribunal is to protect women, the effect is to regulate who does and who does not 
constitute a valid woman. It is a way of policing the boundaries of gender and, in doing 
so, rigidly excluding those whose anatomy places them outside comfortably established 
categories.  
Daly’s invocation of necrophilia also invites comparison to Ms. Forrester’s relega-
tion to a zero. Daly’s use of necrophilia as a concept suggests that, to her, the 
transgender body is an empty body without moral or spiritual value. It is a body without 
human value or content, a lifeless body. Janice Raymond’s comments, also cited by 
Stryker, above, are also evocative of the ominous “0” in Forrester, in that they call for 
“mandating [transsexuality] out of existence.” It could certainly be argued that the police 
in Forrester did exhibit the level of conscious transphobia shown by Raymond and Daly. 
One could say that their responses to Ms. Forrester were because of ignorance rather 
than hatred. However, the behaviour of the police was informed by a mindset that, if 
not similar in severity to Raymond and Daly, is at least similar in genesis. It is a mindset 
that sees unrecognizable bodies as the objects of fear and threat. To draw on  
Nussbaum, it is a clear illustration of the politics of disgust. 
VII. XY: THE BEGINNINGS OF CHANGE 
XY v Ontario (Minister of Government and Consumer Services) is not related to incarcera-
tion, but is worth examining because of its significant implications in terms of 
transgender jurisprudence in Canada. XY represents a significant victory for transgender 
rights in Canada through the unhinging of anatomy from gender in a state-administered 
context. The issue in XY was brought forth by XY, a transgender woman. It concerned 
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whether section 36 of the Vital Statistics Act (VSA), which required that an individual 
have “transsexual surgery” before being able to change the sex designation on his or her 
birth certificate, was discriminatory under sections 1 and 11 of Ontario’s Human Rights 
Code.97 In 2008, XY obtained a bilateral orchiectomy (the removal of both testicles) in 
order to meet the requirement of “transsexual surgery” under the VSA and have the 
sex on her birth certificate changed.98 XY’s decision to have this procedure done was in 
part because of the requirement under the VSA.99 XY felt compelled to alter her body 
in order for her gender to be recognized. A birth certificate, which is the foundation for 
obtaining many other documents, such as passports, is a vital means of recognition by 
the state. Its inability to reflect an individual’s authentic identity not only causes incon-
venience but can be the foundation for discriminatory treatment beyond the document 
itself. XY testified that she had significant fears of assault and discrimination in em-
ployment and housing situations when presenting herself as a woman but showing 
identification that marked her as male.100 
The Ontario Human Rights Tribunal, which heard the case, held that the require-
ment under the VSA was discriminatory on the basis of the protected grounds of sex 
and disability.101 The Tribunal held that section 36 of the VSA resulted in “distinct and 
disadvantageous treatment of the applicant on the basis of her status as a transgendered 
person.”102 Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the requirement that Ontario birth 
certificates reflect an individual’s birth sex unless this person has had “transsexual sur-
gery,” was “substantively discriminatory because it perpetuates stereotypes about 
transgendered persons and their need to have surgery in order to live in accordance with 
their gender identity.”103 To paraphrase, the requirement for surgery effectively desig-
nated some transgender people as authentic and some as inauthentic. In the words of 
Tribunal, 
The message conveyed [through s 36 of the VSA] is that a transgendered 
person’s gender identity only becomes valid and deserving of recognition if 
she surgically alters her body through “transsexual surgery.” This reinforces 
the prejudicial view in society that, unless and until a transgendered person 
has “transsexual surgery,” we as a society are entitled to disregard their felt 
and expressed gender identity and treat them as if they are “really” the sex  
assigned at birth. After all, if the law says that a transgendered woman is not 
“female” until she has had and proved that she has had “transsexual sur-
gery,” how can we expect more from citizens at large?104 
XY raised this point at the Tribunal, testifying that she felt insulted and degraded be-
cause the truth of her gender was judged only in accordance with her genitals.105 
Many of the statements made in the XY decision are significant in terms of their 
recognition of the importance that the state and the law affirm an individual’s right to 
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self-determine his or her identity. The Tribunal recognized that the surgical requirement 
of section 36 of the VSA further disadvantages an already disadvantaged group and 
unjustifiably requires members of this group to undergo intrusive and painful surgery in 
order to have their gender identity recognized on such a vital state document.106 While 
some transgender people desire sex reassignment surgery, many do not. To use surgery 
as the basis for recognition means denying and invalidating the core identity of many 
individuals. 
I have drawn on the XY case in order to demonstrate how Canadian jurisprudence 
is moving away from the historical tradition of defining people in accordance with their 
genitals. Though it is difficult to conceive of a prison system that does not adhere so 
rigidly to the gender binary, it is vital to question how prisons can and must better serve 
the needs of transgender inmates. The decision in Kavanagh, while advancing some ele-
ments of transgender rights, was also rigid in defining individuals in terms of their 
sexual anatomy. Through the inclusion of gender identity and gender expression in the 
Human Rights Codes of four provinces and the decision in XY that state recognition of 
gender is not dependent on genitals, transgender rights are gaining momentum in Cana-
da. What this will mean for incarcerated transgender women is not easy to predict. 
As a recent human rights case, XY represents the right of transgender people to be 
treated with dignity and granted due recognition under the law. However, another  
recent human rights case, Nixon, privileges the right of cisgender women to be protect-
ed from transgender women. If a case like Kavanagh were heard today, in which a pre-
operative transgender woman challenged her placement in a male prison, the logic of 
XY would clash with Nixon. I am not suggesting that these two cases would necessarily 
be cited in this scenario; however, for the purposes of this paper, they epitomize two 
camps of thought that would likely be in issue if a similar case arose. The logic of XY 
recognizes an individual’s right to be acknowledged by the state as his or her lived gen-
der. It also demonstrates an awareness of the power the state has to legitimize identity 
through its recognition and how this power can either confirm or compromise one’s 
dignity. The logic of Nixon, however, recognizes the rights of cisgender women to be 
protected from transgender women because of past experiences with male violence. 
In theory, Forrester represents a compromise where these two logics can be recon-
ciled. While the Tribunal in Forrester refused to allow the Police Services Board an “opt 
out” clause, by which female officers would not have to strip search pre-operative 
transgender women, it did allow for special circumstances in which a cisgender woman 
officer could opt out if her own Charter or human rights interests were compromised.107 
Such a scenario might arise when such an officer had in her past experienced male vio-
lence and would be negatively affected by having to perform a search on or near male 
anatomy. The Tribunal in Forrester recognized that there might be cases in which cis-
gender women need and should have protection. However, it did not allow transgender 
individuals’ rights to be compromised solely because of the possibility that cisgender 
women could feel discomfort. The Tribunal in Forrester recognized that there are some 
instances where the agenda of protecting women is based in actual, documentable need, 
but there are other instances where this agenda could be used to legitimize transphobic 
fears through problematic law and policy. Genital-based placement in prisons does not 
sufficiently distinguish between these two bases. Current policy still defines individuals 
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by sexual anatomy, thus lending credence to the essentialist notion that what is between 
a person’s legs should speak for and define that person. This logic reduces people to but 
one aspect of their bodies and, in doing so, erases an aspect of identity that is one of the 
most fundamental parts of human identity. 
